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Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Richardson Constr., 123 Nev. Adv. Op. 39  
(Oct. 4, 2007)1  
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE – STATUTORY DAMAGES AND SANCTIONS 
 
Summary 
 
Appeal from judgment awarding $225,000 to Richardson Construction and order 
imposing sanctions upon Clark County School District (hereinafter “CCSD”). 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 Remanded.  The Nevada Supreme Court held that (1) NRS 41.035 limited Richardson’s 
claim of tortuous interference to the $50,000 statutory cap on tort damages against Nevada and 
its political subdivisions, and (2) while the district court was proper in imposing sanctions upon 
CCSD, it subsequently applied the sanctions in an overly broad manner, which was error. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
CCSD hired Richardson Construction to construct improvements to the school district’s 
food service facilities.  When construction was complete, a subcontractor filed a complaint 
against Richardson for unpaid amounts due for its work.  Subsequently, Richardson brought a 
third-party complaint against CCSD for various claims, including indemnity, contribution, and 
wrongful interference with a prospective business advantage.  The third-party complaint is the 
subject of this suit. 
 
During discovery, Richardson was late in producing its expert’s report on delay damages 
allegedly caused by CCSD.  CCSD filed a motion in limine to exclude the expert’s report.  
CCSD argued it did not have sufficient time to prepare a defense against the claim of delayed 
damages. 
 
At the hearing on CCSD’s motion, Richardson argued that its expert’s report was late 
because CCSD had not produced documents needed to complete the report, including a file from 
CCSD employee Dan McPartlin (hereinafter “McPartlin”).  McPartlin provided an affidavit 
which stated that no other material existed regarding the subject matter of the lawsuit that had 
not already been provided.  The district court relied on this affidavit and found that CCSD was 
not responsible for delaying Richardson’s expert’s report.  Thus, the court granted CCSD’s 
motion to exclude the expert’s testimony on delay damages. 
 
However, conflict arose during trial because McPartlin testified that he possessed a file 
which had not been given to the parties’ attorneys.  McPartlin stated that he did not think the file 
contained anything that had not already been produced during discovery.  The court ordered 
McPartlin to produce the file, which contained nearly 1,700 documents.  The court then held a 
                                                 
1 Summarized by Danielle Tarmu 
hearing to determine whether and how to sanction CCSD for not producing the documents 
earlier. 
 
After considering conflicting testimonies of Richard Prato, a CCSD attorney, and 
McPartlin at the sanctions hearing, the district court issued sanctions against CCSD.  The court 
found that of the 1,700 documents McPartlin produced, 500 to 700 of them had not been 
previously produced by CCSD.  Therefore, the court determined that in addition to CCSD 
producing documents late, McPartlin had issued a false affidavit.  Among other sanctions not at 
issue in this case, the court struck all of CCSD’s affirmative defenses, stating that “[CCSD] will 
not be able to raise any facts or issues relative to their affirmative defenses.”2 
 
During the remainder of the trial, the district court prevented CCSD from presenting 
evidence on any of its affirmative defenses.  The court did so without analyzing whether the 
evidence was offered in support of an affirmative defense or if it was offered to rebut 
Richardson’s prima facie case.  To prevent the jury from considering earlier admitted evidence 
related to CCSD’s affirmative defenses, the court also approved three limiting jury instructions. 
 
The jury returned a verdict in Richardson’s favor, awarding it (among other damages) 
$225,000 for CCSD’s wrongful interference with a prospective business advantage and $500,000 
on its claims for contribution and indemnification.  CCSD moved for a new trial, but soon 
thereafter requested that the district court summarily deny the motion, which the court did.  
CCSD then appealed from the judgment and from the order denying its new trial motion.  
Although the Nevada Supreme Court dismissed the appeal from the order denying a new trial, it 
permitted CCSD to proceed with its appeal from the district court’s judgment entered upon the 
jury verdict. 
 
Discussion 
 
1. Statutory Limitation on Tort Damages Under NRS 41.035 
 
CCSD asserted that the district court erred in upholding the jury’s verdict of $225,000 on 
Richardson’s tortious inference claim because NRS 41.035 puts a statutory limitation of $50,000 
on tort damages awarded against political subdivisions.  Richardson argued that CCSD waived 
any such limitation by failing to assert it as a defense. 
 
The Court concluded that the statutory limitation could not be waived because under the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity, Nevada and all its political subdivisions received blanket 
immunity from tort liability.3  Despite this blanket immunity, the legislature has waived this 
immunity on a limited basis,4 and included a limitation permitting a party to recover up to 
$50,000 against such Nevada institutions.5  The statutory cap functions automatically as a 
                                                 
2 Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Richardson Constr., 123 Nev. Adv. Op. 39  
(Oct. 4, 2007). 
3 See County of Clark v. Upchurch, 114 Nev. 749, 756, 961 P.2d 754, 759 (1998). 
4 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.031(1). 
5 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.035(1). 
damage limitation up to $50,000 in tort recovery against Nevada and its political subdivisions.  
Thus, CCSD did not have a duty to assert the damage limitation as an affirmative defense. 
 
Richardson further asserted that the $225,000 award was proper because CCSD engaged 
in five separate instances of tortious interference.  However, the $50,000 cap applies on a per-
person, per-claim basis.6  “Claim” means “cause of action”7 – not each instance of the wrong.  
Richardson’s third-party complaint stated only one cause of action for tortious interference 
against CCSD.  Therefore, the Court concluded that the jury’s verdict of $225,000 for tortious 
interference with a prospective business advantage must be capped according to NRS 41.035.  
The Court remanded the case to district court and ordered that if the jury found for Richardson 
on this claim, the court could not award more than $50,000. 
 
2. District Court Error in Applying its Sanction Order 
 
CCSD argued that the district court erred in applying its sanction order because the court 
did not only preclude evidence related to CCSD’s affirmative defenses, but also all evidence 
needed to defend against Richardson’s prima facie case, effectively striking CCSD’s entire 
answer.  The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that while the district court’s sanction of striking 
CCSD’s affirmative defenses was appropriate, the court’s application of its sanction order 
effectively defaulted CCSD because not all of CCSD’s stated affirmative defenses were, in fact, 
affirmative defenses under NRCP 8(c).  Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in 
applying the sanction order. 
 
Under NRCP 37(b)(2), a district court has discretion to sanction a party for failure to 
comply with a discovery order.  In this case there was substantial evidence to support the district 
court’s decision to sanction CCSD by striking CCSD’s affirmative defenses.  McPartlin signed 
an affidavit stating that all pertinent files had been produced.  The affidavit was false because 
there existed one file containing 500 to 700 documents that had not been previously produced, as 
required under the NRCP 16.1 production provisions.  Therefore, the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in striking CCSD’s affirmative defenses as a sanction.   
 
However, in applying the sanction, the district court abused its discretion by striking 
more than CCSD’s affirmative defenses because this sanction effectively struck CCSD’s entire 
answer.  Not all of CCSD’s stated affirmative defenses were true NRCP 8(c) affirmative 
defenses. 8  Some of the purported affirmative defenses were merely defenses to Richardson’s 
prima facie case.  Although NRCP 8(c) enumerates many affirmative defenses, to find which of 
CCSD’s stated affirmative defenses were “true” affirmative defenses under NRCP 8(c) the Court 
had to determine which defenses fell under its “catchall” provision.  Thus, the Court adopted the 
test used by federal courts – allegations must be pleaded as affirmative defenses if they raise 
                                                 
6 Upchurch, 114 Nev. at 759, 961 P.2d at 761. 
7 See id. at 757-59, 961 P.2d at 759-61. 
8 NRCP 8(c) states which defenses a party must plead affirmatively.  A party must affirmatively plead “accord and 
satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, 
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res 
judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, and waiver.”  The rule also provides a “catchall” that “any other 
matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense” must be set forth affirmatively. 
“new facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiff’s . . . claim, even if all allegations 
are true.”9   
 
The Court addressed each of CCSD’s stated affirmative defenses and applied its newly 
adopted test.  The Court determined that the following defenses raised new facts and arguments 
that, if proven, would defeat Richardson’s claim and were thus true affirmative defenses:  
mitigation of damages, failure of Richardson to fulfill conditions precedent, breach of covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, and waiver.  Since these were all NRCP 8(c) affirmative defenses, 
the district court properly precluded CCSD from presenting evidence related to them.  However, 
CCSD did not need to plead the remaining stated defenses affirmatively.  These defenses are as 
follows:  failure to state a claim,10 Richardson’s damages were caused by others,11 Richardson’s 
damages are speculative,12 and CCSD performed under the contract.13  Since these defenses 
were not true affirmative defenses, the district court abused its discretion by precluding evide
related to them. 
nce 
 
Conclusion 
 
CCSD could not waive its statutory damages protection under NRS 41.035, but the 
district court erred in its application of sanctions against CCSD.  Any tort damages awarded must 
be limited to $50,000, even though CCSD did not raise its immunity under NRS 41.035 in its 
answer.  The Court affirmed the district court’s decision to impose sanctions against CCSD, but 
concluded that the district court applied the sanction in an overly broad manner.  The sanctions 
precluded all evidence that CCSD presented relating to all CCSD’s stated affirmative defenses, 
although not all of the defenses were true affirmative defenses under NRCP 8(c).  Accordingly, 
the Court reversed the district court’s judgment upon the jury verdict and remanded for a new 
trial on the tort and contract claims consistent with its opinion. 
                                                 
9 Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 350 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Wolf v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 71 
F.3d 444, 449 (1st Cir. 1995). 
10 NRCP 12(h)(2) permits raising the NRCP 12(b)(5) defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted at the pleading stage, by a motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at trial on the merits.  An affirmative 
defense under NRCP 8(c) is waived if not set forth in a pleading.  Comparing these requirements caused the Court to 
conclude that an NRCP 12(b)(5) defense is not an affirmative defense because it can be asserted at any time. 
11 This stated affirmative defense essentially claimed that Richardson’s damages were not caused by CCSD.  In tort 
actions, a defendant’s allegations that a party other than the defendant caused the plaintiff’s damages does not need 
to be set forth affirmatively because such allegations negate an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim – proximate 
cause.  Similarly, causation is an essential element to breach of contract claims.  Wisconsin Knife Works v. National 
Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1289 (7th Cir. 1986).  Here, Richardson asserted both tort and contract claims, 
alleging that CCSD was the cause of Richardson’s damages.  Since CCSD’s stated affirmative defense sought to 
negate an essential element of Richardson’s claims (causation), CCSD did not have to plead it affirmatively. 
12 The plaintiff has the burden to prove the amount of damages it is seeking.  Frantz v. Johnson, 116 Nev. 455, 469-
70, 999 P.2d 351, 360 (2000).  Courts placing this burden on the plaintiff generally maintain that an allegation that 
the plaintiff’s damages are speculative need not be pleaded as an affirmative defense because the plaintiff’s burden 
necessarily puts at issue whether the damages are speculative.  See Clark v. Milam, 152 F.R.D. 66, 73 (S.D. W. Va. 
1993); Gilbert v. Eli Lilly & Co. Inc., 56 F.R.D. 116 125 (D. P.R. 1972); Sharon Leasing v. Phil Terese Transp., 701 
N.E.2d 1150, 1157-59 (Ill. Ct. App. 1998). 
13 This stated affirmative defense merely asserts that CCSD did not breach the contract, which was put at issue by 
Richardson’s claims.  Therefore, CCSD did not need to plead this allegation affirmatively. 
